

A Write-Friendly and Fast-Recovery Scheme for Security Metadata in Non-Volatile Memories

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HPCA 2021

Outline


Background and Motivation

STAR Mechanism

➢ Evaluation

≻Conclusion

Non-Volatile Memory



NVMs need to ensure the data crash-consistency after system crashes and reboots

Threat Models in NVM

Leaking sensitive data to attackers

• Snooping bus; Scanning memory; Stealing DIMM

Solution: Encryption

[Silent shredder@asplos16,Secret@DAC16...]




• Tampering data; Replaying data

Solution: Integrity Verification [Anubis@ISCA19,Triad-NVM@ISCA19...]





Direct Encryption




➢Insecure

Unchanged secret key

≻Low performance

• Decryption on the read critical path

Counter Mode Encryption




Safer than direct AES

Lower performance penalty than


We use CME to encrypt data

Integrity Verification


SGX Integrity Tree (SIT): Counters and Message Authentication Codes (MACs)



Security Metadata



Metadata Inconsistency





Security metadata in NVM

Stale security metadata can't ensure the system security after reboots

Problems of Recovering Metadata

- High write overheads
- Persisting tree nodes from leaves to root






Problems of Recovering Metadata

- High write overheads
- Persisting tree nodes from leaves to root

- Long recovery time
- Reconstructing all nodes layer by layer




Problems of Recovering Metadata

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Long recovery time

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Incorrectly recovery




Attacking nodes during recovery

Our design goal: correctly recover the security metadata with low write overhead and short recovery time

Observation

Modifications in the updated nodes




Only the corresponding counter increases by 1, and MAC is updated.

Observation

Unused space in MAC (Message Authentication Code) field

64-bit MAC field in data line

• 54-bit MAC is also safe[1].



[1] Saileshwar, Gururaj and Nair, Prashant J and Ramrakhyani, Prakash and Elsasser, Wendy and Joao, Jose A and Qureshi, Moinuddin K. Morphable Counters: Enabling Compact Integrity Trees For Low-Overhead Secure Memories. MICRO18

Solutions

- Store the right metadata with low overhead
 - Recovering stale metadata using right metadata
- Identify the stale metadata
 - Only restoring the stale metadata
- Verify the recovery process
 - Detecting the attacks occurring during recovery

We propose an efficient recovery scheme STAR

Outline


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STAR Components




STAR Components

Counter-MAC synergization Persist the modifications w/o extra writes

Bitmap lines
Record the locations of stale metadata for reducing recovery time


Cache tree Detect the attacks during recovery

Counter-MAC Synergization



Incurring modifications in parent node via persisting child node


Counter-MAC Synergization




Persisting the child node and modifications in one write

Counter-MAC Synergization

Restoring stale counter and MAC






STAR Components

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Cache tree Detect the attacks during recovery

Bitmap Lines




Bitmap lines in write queue with ADR

Recovery area in NVM

512-bit bitmap line



Bitmap Lines




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Reading zero bitmap lines is useless to locate stale metadata

Multi-layer Index

Only reading non-zero bitmap lines



Indicating the non-zero bitmap lines and stale metadata

STAR Components

Counter-MAC synergization
Persist the modifications w/o extra writes

Bitmap lines
Record the locations of stale metadata for reducing recovery time

Cache tree
Detect the attacks during recovery

Attacks during recovery

C1

Fresh MSBs of C2


C2

C3

+

C4

Replay attack



MAC

Incorrect recovery



Attacks can't be detected in traditional integrity verification schemes

C5

Old LSBs of C2


C6

C2

incorrect C2


C7

Cache Structure



Cache tree

Set-Way cache: 8 ways in a set




Logically order the dirty lines via the ascending addresses




Generate the Set-MAC via dirty lines in the set

Cache tree



Cache tree

During recovery, we reconstruct the cache tree to detect the attacks



Replayed

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Experimental Setup


Gem5 + NVMain

Processor	8 cores(2 GHz); L1(64 KB), L2(512 KB), L3(4 MB) Caches
Memory Controller	Security Metadata Cache(512 KB); Bitmap Lines(16 lines, 1 KB)
NVM	16 GB; tRCD/tCL/tCWD/tFAW/tWTR/tWR =48/15/13/50/7.5/300 ns
Secure Parameters	SIT (9 levels); Cache Tree (4 levels)

Comparisons


Write-back cache (WB)	Baseline, fail to recover system
STAR	Our work
Anubis[ISCA19]	1x extra memory writes
Strict Persistence	Persist all nodes in a branch of tree

Write traffic



SATR reduces 92% extra writes than Anubis

Energy Consumption



Compared with Anubis, SATR reduces 42% energy overheads

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Conclusion

Design Goal

Correctly recovering the stale security metadata with low write overhead and short recovery time

Key Idea

- STAR disaggregates the persistence of modifications and addresses of metadata and provides recovery verification
 - Counter-MAC synergization : reduce memory writes
 - Bitmap lines: locate the stale metadata
 - Cache tree: verify the recovery process

Result

STAR reduces 92% extra writes than Anubis and fast recovers the security metadata

Thanks! Q&A

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